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Abstract 
What has been the effect of competition from parallel imports on prices of locally-sourced on-
patent drugs? Did the 2002 Swedish mandatory substitution reform increase this competition? To 
answer these questions, we carried out difference-in-differences estimation on monthly data for a 
panel of all on-patent prescription drugs sold in Sweden during the 40 months from January 2001 
through April 2004. On average, facing competition from parallel imports caused a 15-17% fall 
in price. While the reform increased the effect of competition from parallel imports, it was only 
by 0.9%. The reform, however, did increase the effect of therapeutic competition by 1.6%. 
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Introduction 
During the period 1998-2008, average annual real growth in pharmaceutical spending has 
exceeded that in overall health spending in the EU. Spending on pharmaceuticals averaged 4.7% 
growth per year, while overall health spending grew 4% (OECD, 2010). Pharmaceutical 
spending accounted for 1.7% of GDP on average across the EU countries in 2008.1 The largest 
part of pharmaceutical spending, about 50%, is for on-patent locally-sourced drugs, i.e. drugs 
with patent protection that are directly supplied by the manufacturer via authorized wholesalers. 
Until the patent expires and generics enter the market – unless parallel trade is allowed – these 
drugs are only subject to competition from therapeutic alternatives. We here analyze the price-
effects of competition for these drugs, focusing on competition from parallel imports and the 
effects of a mandatory substitution reform on the intensity of such competition. 
Parallel imported drugs are legally produced goods bought in low price countries for resale in 
high price countries without the authorization of the patent holder. They have the same active 
ingredient in the same amount and the same dosage form (e.g., tablet or capsule) as the locally-
sourced drugs. However, they might differ in packaging as, depending on the requirement of the 
importing country, they might be repackaged or relabeled, and the brand name might even differ 
slightly. Parallel trade of pharmaceuticals is legally allowed within the EU towards fulfilling the 
objective of creating a single market. But, in the United States, for example, allowing parallel 
trade of pharmaceuticals has for many years, since the Clinton administration, been a hot topic in 
debate on rising pharmaceutical costs. Advocates have claimed that allowing parallel imports 
from Canada, for example, would reduce the pharmaceutical costs substantially, while opponents 
have stated that the safety of parallel imported drugs cannot be guaranteed (Pecorino, 2002). 
Medical insurance is likely to reduce the price competition in pharmaceuticals by making 
consumers’ less price sensitive. To counteract this, substitution policies, giving the right to or 
obliging the pharmacists to substitute the prescribed drug with a cheaper alternative, have been 
introduced in many European countries and American states. These are intended to make 
                                                            
1 The share of pharmaceutical spending in GDP ranged from below 1% in Luxembourg, Norway, and Denmark, to  
more than 2% in Lithuania, Greece, Bulgaria, Hungary, Portugal, and the Slovak Republic. The share in Sweden 
was 1.2%. 
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consumers react more to prices, decreasing cost both directly, as prescribed drugs are replaced 
with cheaper versions, and indirectly, through increased price competition. Sweden introduced a 
mandatory substitution reform in October 2002, requiring pharmacists to dispense, with the 
consent of the consumer, the cheapest available generic or parallel-imported drug, unless the 
prescribing physician opposed substitution for medical reasons. The reform brought in a special 
form of “reference pricing”, whereby drugs with the same active substance - e.g., an off-patent 
drug and its generics, or an on-patent drug and its parallel imported versions - are grouped 
together and the price of the cheapest drug in each group is set as the reference price for 
reimbursement. Maximum reimbursement is fixed at a percentage of that price, but the amount 
consumers actually pay depends on which drug they buy. Consumers who choose a drug with the 
reference price pay only a certain “deductible”, while consumers who choose a drug with a 
higher price still pay that deductible but, in addition, also pay the full price difference.  
The 2002 reform changed the Swedish reference price system which had been introduced in 
January 1993. Before 2002, the reference price system only covered off-patent drugs and their 
generics with the reference price set at 110% of the price of the cheapest available substitute. 
The reform, however, required substitution not only between off-patent drugs and their generics 
but also between on-patent drugs and their parallel imported versions, and set the reference price 
at 100% of the price of the cheapest available substitute. The reform also made it mandatory for 
pharmacists - who otherwise have no incentive for substitution - to dispense the cheapest 
available substitute.2 The new system thus both increased consumers’ information about 
available alternative drugs and their prices and also exposed them more to the prices. 
Such conditional reimbursement is expected to increase consumer price sensitivity and thus 
competition as well. This is consistent with both theoretical results (Mestre-Ferrandiz, 2003; 
Brekke et al., 2007, and Miraldo, 2009) and empirical results (Pavcnik, 2002; Aronsson, 
Bergman, and Rudholm, 2001; Bergman and Rudholm, 2003; Brekke et al., 2009; Granlund, 
2010; Granlund and Rudholm, 2011) that reference pricing type policies promote substitution 
                                                            
2 For example, the UK, Netherlands and Norway provide financial incentives for pharmacists to dispense parallel  
imported drugs (Kyle, 2009). However, other than an annual ex post payment by the county councils, responsible 
for reimbursement, to the Swedish pharmacy state monopoly (the National Corporation of Swedish Pharmacies, 
Apoteket AB) to compensate it for purchasing and dispensing parallel imports and generics, there are no explicit 
financial incentives to Swedish pharmacies to dispense parallel imports (Kanavos et al., 2005).  
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and increase price competition between brand-name drugs and their generics. Regarding 
substitution reforms in general, Buzzelli et al. (2006) estimated that they lowered pharmaceutical 
prices by 3% on average across 16 OECD countries. In country specific analyses, Granlund 
(2010) and Granlund and Rudholm (2011) estimated that the Swedish mandatory substitution 
reform reduced average unweighted prices by 4%, and average weighted prices by 10%. 
Despite the attention that substitution reforms and reference pricing have received, there have 
been, to the best of our knowledge, no empirical studies on how they affect competition from 
parallel imports. This paper attempts to fill this gap. There is, however, a theoretical paper by 
Köksal (2009) showing that reference pricing should increase price competition from parallel 
imports. The theoretical literature regarding parallel trade also includes Pecorino (2002), 
Ganslandt and Maskus (2004), Maskus and Chen (2004), Jelovac and Bordoy (2005), and Chen 
and Maskus (2005), which show, among other things, that parallel imports should create price 
competition and cause prices to fall in the destination country. The empirical literature about the 
effects of competition from parallel imports is limited to Ganslandt and Maskus (2004), Kanavos 
and Costa-Font (2005), and Kyle (2011), none of which addressed reference pricing or 
substitution reforms in general.  
Ganslandt and Maskus (2004) used Swedish data from 1994-1999 to study the effect of 
competition from parallel imports on the prices of the 50 molecules with largest sales values. 
Using instrumental variable method to account for potential endogeneity in the entry decisions of 
parallel traders, they found that competition from parallel imports reduced prices by 12-19%. 
Using OLS, they found that competition from three or more parallel traders was associated with 
5% lower prices, while no statistically significant association was found between prices and 
competition from only one or two parallel traders. Using data on 30 countries, Kyle (2011) 
examined the effect of both potential and actual entry of parallel imports on prices of locally-
sourced drugs, and reported results consistent with the OLS results of Ganslandt and Maskus 
(2004). On the other hand, Kanavos and Costa-Font (2005) estimated the effect of the market 
share of parallel imports on price competition and found no statistically significant effect. 
The analyses in this paper were carried out using a product level panel dataset covering all on-
patent prescription drugs sold in Sweden during January 2001 through April 2004. To identify 
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the effects of competition from parallel imports and how these effects were influenced by the 
mandatory substitution reform, following Pavcnik (2002) and Brekke et al. (2009), we used 
difference-in-differences estimation. Following Ganslandt and Maskus (2004), we also used 
instrumental variable estimation to address potential endogeneity in the entry decisions of 
parallel traders.  
This study adds to the limited knowledge of competition from parallel imports by analyzing how 
the price effects of competition from parallel imports is affected by a mandatory substitution 
reform as well as how it depends on the length of time the parallel imports have been available in 
the market. The dataset also allowed us to control for competition from therapeutic alternatives - 
drugs with different active ingredients but similar therapeutic effects in treating a particular 
disease - including indirect generic competition from off-patent therapeutic alternatives 
themselves facing generic competition.  
The present study thus complements Ganslandt and Maskus (2004) by controlling for both 
“therapeutic competition” (inter-brand competition) and “indirect generic competition” (intra-
brand competition), as well as by analyzing a period when parallel trade had been legal in 
Sweden for many years (it became legal when Sweden joined the EU in 1995) and investigating 
a somewhat different segment of the market. We restricted our attention to on-patent drugs, but 
not just to big sellers. Like Ganslandt and Maskus (2004), we confined our analyses to the price-
effects of facing competition from parallel imports; that is, for example, we did not analyze entry 
and exit decisions of parallel traders, or how those decisions might have been affected by the 
mandatory substitution reform. 
We found that facing competition from parallel imports caused prices of locally-sourced drugs to 
fall on average with 15-17%. The mandatory substitution reform increased this effect causing 
prices to fall further, but only by one percentage point. The full effect of competition from 
parallel imports was not realized immediately, but instead prices kept decreasing over time.  
Our analysis has implications for the effect of reform on therapeutic competition as well. We 
found that the prices of drugs facing therapeutic competition would have been 1.5% less on 
average than if they had not faced such competition. The mandatory substitution reform 
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increased the effect of therapeutic competition by 1.6 percentage points. The effect of therapeutic 
competition depended on whether the therapeutic alternatives were subject to generic 
competition. Facing therapeutic competition led to a statistically significant fall in prices if the 
therapeutic alternatives were themselves subject to generic competition. The mandatory 
substitution reform increased this fall, indicating that the reform increased the effects of generic 
competition.  
The next section presents the institutional structure of the Swedish pharmaceutical market, 
focusing first on reimbursement for prescription drugs and the implications of mandatory 
substitution reform in this regard, and then on price setting and distribution of pharmaceuticals. 
The following two sections first provide a theoretical framework, and then an overview of the 
dataset including descriptive statistics. A section then explains the empirical strategy based on 
which the econometric analysis is carried out, followed by a section which reports and discusses 
the estimation results. Finally, the last section summarizes and concludes the paper. 
 
The Institutional Structure of the Swedish Pharmaceutical Market 
Reimbursement and Mandatory Substitution Reform  
Statutory health insurance has covered the whole Swedish population and also subsidized a large 
part of pharmaceutical costs ever since pharmaceutical benefits scheme was introduced in 1955.3 
The subsidy for prescription drugs increases stepwise over any 12-month period. Since June 
1999, consumers pay 100% of the cost up to SEK 900; 50% of the cost from SEK 900 to 1700; 
25% from SEK 1700 to 3300; 10% from SEK 3300 to 4300; and then are fully subsidized during 
the remainder of the 12-month period. During the study period, about 70% of total 
pharmaceutical costs were borne publicly, specifically by the 21 county councils (Köping 
Höggård and Redman, 2007; National Board on Health and Welfare, 2006). The county councils 
- also responsible for providing health care - are required to have at least one “drug and 
therapeutic committee”, the purpose of which is to promote safe and cost effective use of 
                                                            
3 This section refers to law SFS (1981:49) on control of pharmaceutical costs and subsequent changes in this law, 
listed at www.notisum.se/rnp/sls/fakta/a9810049.htm, accessed 30 October 2008. 
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pharmaceuticals, e.g., by writing recommendations to physicians regarding choices of 
pharmaceuticals (Anell and Persson, 2005).  
Reference pricing was introduced as reimbursement scheme in Sweden in 1993. Each off-patent 
drug and its generics were grouped together, with substitution allowed only within groups. A 
reference price was set for each group at 110% of the price of the cheapest available drug within 
the group, usually a generic. Costs exceeding the reference price were not included in the 
maximum annual copayment limit (RFFS 1992:20, 1996:31). Thus consumers who bought an 
expensive drug had to pay the entire difference between it and the reference price, in addition to 
a certain percentage (the coinsurance rate) of the reference price.  
This reference price system was reformed with the introduction of mandatory substitution in 
October 2002. The rule for setting the reference price was changed so that it now was set at 
100% of the price of the cheapest available drug within the group. Still drugs with the same 
active ingredient are grouped together, but since October 2002 on-patent drugs and their parallel 
imported versions are also part of the reference price system (SOU 2000:86, Medical Products 
Agency, 2002).4,5 The reform made substitution compulsory within the group of interchangeable 
drugs, requiring pharmacists to inform consumers of such drugs and to dispense the cheapest 
available generic instead of the off-patent brand-name drug, or the parallel import instead of the 
on-patent brand-name drug (with the consent of the consumer) unless the prescribing physician 
prohibited the substitution for medical reasons.6 The pharmacist must also inform consumers that 
they can buy the more expensive prescribed drug instead of the cheapest substitute if they pay 
                                                            
4 Läkemedelsverket - The Medical Products Agency (MPA) - defines a product as a substitute if it has the same  
active substance, strength, and form (e.g., pills or fluid) as the prescribed product, and if its package size is 
approximately the same as that of the prescribed one. 
5 Parallel imported drugs are covered within the reference pricing system only in Sweden and Denmark (see Lopez- 
  Casasnovas and Puig-Junoy (2000) for an extensive review on reference pricing).  
6 If the physician prohibits the substitution for medical reasons, the consumer is still reimbursed based on the full  
price of the more expensive prescribed drug. Physicians only prohibited substitution for 3% of the prescriptions 
during October 2002 to December 2003 (National Corporation of Swedish Pharmacies et al., 2004). The 
corresponding figure for January 2003 to October 2006 for physicians in the county of Västerbotten was 
2%(Granlund, 2009). Andersson et al. (2005) reports that during the one-year period from October 2002 to 
October 2003 physicians in Västra Götaland region prohibited substitution in 1-8% of prescriptions for selected 
indicator drugs.   
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the difference. The reform clearly makes pharmacists substitute the available cheapest alternative 
within the reference price system where there had previously been no incentive for pharmacists 
to initiate substitution. Before the reform, Apoteket AB – the National Corporation of Swedish 
Pharmacies – recommended that pharmacists dispense parallel imported drugs only if the 
responsible drug and therapeutic committee had not recommended differently and if the 
prescribing physician had only written the name of the drug and thus had not specified either a 
locally-sourced package or a parallel import; and those committees only recommended 
dispensing parallel imports that had a record of reliable supply (Persson, Anell and Persson, 
2001). 
Three characteristics of the mandatory substitution reform may have contributed to making 
consumers more price sensitive, resulting in increased substitution and hence lower 
pharmaceutical prices. The reform lowered the transaction cost of substitution, since previously 
it had been recommended that physicians be contacted first if they had not explicitly consented 
to substitution on the prescription. Then, when substitution is offered (as it always should be 
after the reform), consumers gain information about the availability of cheaper substitutes, which 
might enhance their willingness to switch. Finally, only costs up to 100% of the cheapest 
substitutable product are now covered, compared with 110% previously. 
 
Price Setting and Distribution 
Pharmaceutical manufacturers and parallel traders need approval from Läkemedelsverket - the 
Medical Products Agency (MPA) - to sell their products in Sweden.7 Manufacturers are free to 
set their own prices, but in order to be included in the pharmaceutical benefits scheme they must 
then be approved by Läkemedelsförmånsnämnden (LFN) - the Pharmaceutical Benefits Agency 
- which replaced the National Social Insurance Board as part of the mandatory substitution 
reform in 2002.8 Before that, prices had been negotiated between the manufacturer and the 
                                                            
7  The Medical Products Agency has as objective to send a first response to firms applying for approval for parallel  
import of pharmaceuticals within 120 days from when all necessary pharmaceutical information is received from 
the authorities in the source country (http://www.lakemedelsverket.se, accessed 101020).  
 
8  The name of the Pharmaceutical Benefits Agency (LFN) was changed to the Dental and Pharmaceutical Benefits  
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authority, but on the grounds of efficiency in the market the authority abolished negotiations and 
started to consider price setting as an integrated part of cost-effectiveness analysis.  
Manufacturers can change price after the launch of a product in Sweden by getting approval 
from LFN.9 During the study period, price comparisons played a crucial role in price-setting 
decisions. Both before and after the mandatory substitution reform, applications for price 
increases were required to include motivations for the price increase as well as information about 
the prices and treatment costs of comparable drugs (RFFS 1996:31, LFNFS 2003:1). An 
exception is if the requested price is the same as or less than the price of the most expensive 
substitutable product in the reference group: In this case no motivation is needed and the price 
increase is always accepted (LFNAR 2006:1). This is of little help for locally-sourced brand-
name drugs, however, which are generally the most expensive in their reference group. In fact, 
price comparisons have probably made it harder for these drugs to get approval for price 
increases if they face competition. Even though a drug faces competition from parallel imports, 
the authority might still allow a price increase, since the supply of parallel imports is limited, and 
sometimes unreliable. If the drug would be removed from the market unless the price increase 
were approved and if supply of parallel imports was limited, patients would then face the risk of 
remaining untreated.  
Unlike the regulations before the mandatory substitution reform (RFFS 1996:31), the regulations 
after the reform (LFNFS 2003:1) clearly state that the authority should consider marginal 
benefits and marginal costs of a drug when deciding whether or not to include it in the 
reimbursement scheme at the requested price. Hence competition between therapeutically 
equivalent drugs should be fiercer after the reform, not because of more price sensitive 
consumers - since the reform didn’t allow substitution between therapeutic alternatives - but 
because of the requirement that marginal benefits and marginal costs should be considered to be 
included in the reimbursement system.  
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Agency (TLV) on September 1, 2008, since a dental care reform went into effect in July, 2008 and a new  
Dental Care Benefits Board was established. 
9  The National Social Insurance Board was allowed 90 days (or under some circumstances 180 days) to decide  
whether to approve price changes (RFFS 1996:31). The Pharmaceutical Benefits Board is required to decide  
whether to approve price cuts as soon as possible, but is allowed 90 days (or under some circumstances 150 days) 
to handle applications for price increase (SFS 2002:687).  
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During the first few months of the study-period, the National Social Insurance Board applied a 
specific rule for pricing parallel imports, approving an application only if the price was at least 
10% below that of the locally-sourced drug. After the EU Commission ruled this discriminatory, 
the Board changed this rule in the spring of 2001. However, both before and after this change, a 
large majority of the prices of parallel imports were set about 10% below the price of the locally-
sourced drug (National Social Insurance Board, 2002).  
Retail pharmacies are the only legal entities in Sweden to dispense prescription drugs for 
outpatient care. Throughout the study period, all pharmacies were owned by the government 
monopoly, Apoteket AB - the National Corporation of Swedish Pharmacies - which paid and 
charged uniform prices nationwide for each drug. In July 2009, the pharmacy market was 
deregulated and private pharmacies were allowed to enter, but still the retail prices of 
prescription drugs remain uniform across the country. 
 
Theoretical Framework 
There are few studies examining the effects of parallel trade on prices in pharmaceuticals. 
Ganslandt and Maskus (2004) show the price-effect of parallel trade by setting up a model where 
each parallel trader supplies a limited quantity of drugs to the destination country and where the 
parallel imports are assumed to be sold at lower prices than locally-sourced drugs to guarantee 
that the entire quantity of parallel imports is sold, while price in the source country is held fixed. 
In this model, the residual demand that a locally-sourced drug faces, and hence its price, fall with 
the number of parallel traders.  
Ganslandt and Maskus provide convincing reasons why parallel traders will not supply unlimited 
amounts, e.g., that the amounts they can buy in the low price countries are limited.10 Still, they 
show that, if parallel traders could supply an unlimited amount without affecting the margin 
between the price they pay and the price they charge, then potential competition would result in 
price convergence up to the cost of trade. Similarly, Pecorino (2002) argues that there is no 
                                                            
10 Supply of pharmaceuticals in source countries is limited, so the marginal cost of supply is likely to increase more,  
and to vary more, for parallel traders than for generic producers. 
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reason for the law of one price not to hold for pharmaceuticals if parallel trade is allowed and 
trade cost is zero. Jelovac and Bordoy (2005) analyze the case where consumers consider parallel 
imports inferior to locally-sourced drugs, e.g., due to differences in packing. Allowing parallel 
trade again leads to price convergence with lower prices in the destination country, though prices 
do not fully converge because of the perceived inferiority of the parallel imports.11 
Different from the above mentioned studies, Frank and Salkever (1992) model competition from 
generics. Parallel imports differ from generics in terms of supply conditions and variation in 
marginal cost, but their model is general enough to derive effects of competition from parallel 
imports as well as effects of mandatory substitution on competition. The model includes one 
brand name producer, n identical generic producers, and two types of consumers: price-
insensitive loyal consumers, whose demand is unaffected by the price of generics; and cross-
price sensitive consumers, whose demand is influenced by both the brand-name and generic 
prices. Frank and Salkever show that the brand-name price would fall with entry of generic 
producers, unless entry leads to a fall in both demand for the brand-name drug and the own-price 
elasticity of its demand. So, unless a fall in demand also leads to less price-sensitive marginal 
consumers, entry of generics is likely to reduce brand-name price. Frank and Salkever also show 
that, under reasonable conditions, an increase in the share of price-sensitive consumers will 
enhance the downward pressure exerted by entry of generics on brand-name prices. This result 
should also apply for the effect of entry of parallel imports on prices of locally-sourced drugs. 
Hence, as mandatory substitution is likely to make consumers more price sensitive, it is likely to 
enhance the downward pressure exerted on brand-name prices by competition from both generics 
and parallel imports.  
Demand models, like that of Frank and Salkever (1992), have implications for therapeutic 
competition as well. If demand is sensitive to relative prices among therapeutic alternatives, the 
price of a drug whose therapeutic alternatives gain generic competition would also fall. Given 
that price is a positive function of demand, this would happen: (i) if the price of the brand-name 
drug facing generic competition falls and brand name therapeutic alternatives are substitutes; (ii) 
if the generics are substitutes for therapeutically equivalent brand-name drugs. Also, entry of 
                                                            
11 Maskus and Chen (2004) and Chen and Maskus (2005) provide theoretical analyses of parallel trade in general,  
not focusing just on pharmaceuticals.  
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therapeutic alternatives should reduce the price of a drug if it reduces demand for that drug (and 
again, if price is a positive function of demand). Mandatory substitution reform, by making 
consumers more price sensitive, has increased price competition in Sweden and reduced the 
prices of both generics and brand-name drugs facing generic competition (Granlund and 
Rudholm, 2011). Therefore, given that demand is sensitive to relative prices among therapeutic 
alternatives, we expect the effect of therapeutic alternatives gaining generic competition to be 
larger after the substitution reform.  
Köksal (2009) also strengthens our expectation that mandatory substitution increases competition 
from parallel imports. Based on the two-country model of Jelovac and Bordoy (2005), where 
consumers perceived parallel imports as inferior, she examined theoretically the extent to which 
healthcare reimbursement policies should affect the results of parallel trade. It is assumed that a 
monopoly manufacturer produces a patented drug and supplies the two countries. The 
manufacturer price differentiates since the two countries are assumed to differ in their 
consumers’ valuations of the drug, as well as in the share of the price paid directly by the 
consumers. Given the price difference between the two countries, parallel traders - in a perfectly 
competitive market with no cost of trade - buy the drug in low price country and resell it in the 
high price country. Parallel trade then causes greater price reduction under reference pricing than 
under simple coinsurance at a constant rate regardless of the price of the drug chosen. As the 
2002 reform aimed to strengthen the effect of reference pricing by making substitution 
mandatory for the pharmacist and increasing out-of-pocket costs for the consumer, we expect it 
to have increased the competition from parallel imports.  
 
Overview of the Data 
The study is based on a panel-data set covering all prescription drugs sold in Sweden during 
1992-2007. An observation in the dataset represents a product with a certain active ingredient, 
strength, form, and package size, supplied by a certain firm and sold in a certain month (though 
only quarterly data for 1992-1994). For each observation the dataset includes information about 
whether the product is brand-name or generic, locally-sourced or parallel imported, as well as 
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total units sold and the total value. In order to efficiently isolate the effect of the 2002 mandatory 
substitution reform on competition from parallel imports, only data from January 2001 through 
April 2004 was used. Using older data, due to adjustments to the existence of parallel imports, 
might have distorted the estimations. Parallel imports were allowed starting in 1995 when 
Sweden joined the European Union, but their extent was very limited the first two years, and 
Ganslandt and Maskus (2004) expressed the belief that the market was not in long-run 
equilibrium even at the end of their study period, in 1998.12 Data after April 2004 was not used 
since 10 countries - new potential source countries for parallel imports - joined the EU in May 
2004, possibly distorting the results.  
Table 1. The Swedish prescription pharmaceutical market, 1997-2007 
   
1997  
 
 
1998 
 
1999 
 
2000 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
2004 
 
2005  
 
2006 
 
2007 
 
GDP  
 
1927001  2012091  2123971  2249987  2326176   2420761   2515150  2624964  2735218  2900790  3063145 
 
TPS 
 
13984  16270   18148   19934  21301  22872  23301   23807   24819  25943  23067 
 
PI 
 
272  1008  1402  1754  2012  2090  2100  2527   3018   3012  2707 
 
PI/TPS 
 
2%   6%   7,7%  8,8%  9,4%   9,1%   9%  10,6%   12,1%   11,6%  11,7% 
# PI 
Firms  2   8  10  9  9  10  11  11  9  12   14  
 
 
Notes: GDP, TPS and PI are in million SEK and expressed in nominal terms. TPS and PI are abbreviations for total pharmaceutical sales and total 
sales value of parallel imports respectively. PI/TPS represents the share of parallel imports in total pharmaceutical sales. 
Source: Intercontinental Medical Statistics (IMS) 
 
Prescription pharmaceutical sales constituted about 0.9% of GDP during 2001-2004 (Table 1). 
Both the share of parallel imports in total pharmaceutical sales (PI/TPS) and the number of 
parallel traders increased substantially in 1998, due to the integration of Sweden in the EU 
(Ganslandt and Maskus, 2004). While the share of parallel imports was 2% in 1997, it was 6% in 
1998 and the number of parallel traders increased from 2 in 1997 to 8 in 1998. There was no 
                                                            
12 It is possible that pharmacists and consumers changed their attitudes as they learned more about parallel imports  
during the first few years they were in the market. This might have changed the effect of competition from parallel 
imports in the years prior to our study period.  
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similar change in the share of parallel imports or in the number of parallel traders during 2001-
2004.  
The empirical analysis focuses only on locally-sourced on-patent prescription drugs. Off-patent 
and parallel imported drugs were used to create the relevant variables for the analysis but were 
excluded in the final dataset. No information on the dates of patent expiration was available. 
Instead, we defined pharmaceuticals as off-patent starting the first time any generic with the 
same active ingredient was sold in Sweden.  
Table 2. Descriptive statistics for variables used in estimations 
Variable  Mean    Std. Dev.   Min    Max
lnp  5.7571  1.5356 1.9201 11.7574
Picomp   0.1309  0.3373 0 1
Pifirms  0.3257  1.0297 0 9
Mpi  4.0016  11.6196 0 79
Thcomp  0.8437  0.3631 0 1
Nthcomp  3.1403  2.4750 0 12
Thgencomp  0.2071  0.3404 0 1
Ref  0.4666  0.4988 0 1
Ref*Picomp  0.0662  0.2487 0 1
Ref*Pifirms   0.1541  0.6863 0 8
Ref*Mpi  2.3156  9.6610 0 79
Ref*Thcomp  0.3847  0.4888 0 1
Ref* Nthcomp  1.4818  2.3239 0 12
Ref*Thgencomp  0.1040  0.2609 0 1
Time  20.2653  11.5346 1 40
Timepi  2.7899     8.3111    0    40
EURO/SEK  9.1794  0.1485 8.8963 9.6670
Lnlong  4.1716  0.7975 ‐0.6931 4.6868
 
Table 2 presents the variables used in the econometric analysis and the descriptive statistics on 
the data. The variable itpln is the natural logarithm of the real price (wholesale price in month t  
deflated by consumer price index). Picompit is an indicator for whether drug i  is subject to 
competition from parallel imports (hereafter PI-competition) and Pifirmsit is the number of 
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parallel traders drug i  faces competition from.
13 Mpiit is defined as the number of months drug i 
had faced competition from parallel imports before month t. Thcompit is a dummy controlling for 
whether a drug has any therapeutic competitors, Nthcompit is the number of therapeutic 
competitors and Thgencompit is the share of product i’s therapeutic competitors facing generic 
competition.14 Reft is a dummy variable taking the value one for the months after the mandatory 
substitution reform and the following six variables are interaction variables between Reft and the 
variables mentioned above. Timet is the number of the month, starting from January 2001, and 
Timepiit is an interaction variable between this variable and Picompit. The last two variables are 
instruments used in instrumental variable regressions: the Euro/SEK exchange rate and the 
logarithm of the number of months the product has been sold in Sweden (Lnlongit).15  
Of the 3,339 on-patent prescription drugs with different active ingredient, strength, and form 
(102,235 observations) 84% faced therapeutic competition while only 13% faced competition 
from parallel imports (Table 2). Descriptive statistics, not presented in the table, show that for 
drugs that face competition from parallel imports, the average market share in units for parallel 
imports is 39%. 
 
Econometric Analysis 
A difference-in-differences strategy was used to identify the effects of competition from parallel 
imports (hereafter PI-competition) on prices of locally-sourced drugs and how these effects were 
influenced by the 2002 mandatory substitution reform. The effects of facing PI-competition were 
identified by comparing changes in prices of drugs that gained or lost PI-competition with those 
of drugs that did not face changes in PI-competition. The effect of the reform was identified by 
comparing the price-effects of changes in PI-competition before the reform with those after, as 
                                                            
13 A parallel imported drug is considered to be a pi-competitor to the locally sourced drug if it has the  
same substance (i.e., 7-digit ATC code), strength, and form (e.g. pill or fluid) as that drug and are sold in  
Sweden the same month. Since, for example, a 100-pill package can substitute for two 50-pill packages, it is not 
required that the parallel import be of the same package size as the locally-sourced drug. 
14 Following Brekke et al. (2008) and Pavcnik (2002) pharmaceuticals with the same 5-digit ATC code were  
classified as therapeutic competitors. 
15 In order to be able to take the natural logarithm we defined longit equal to 0.5 the first month a product was sold,  
and so on. Lnlongit is the natural logarithm of a variable truncated at 108.5 months due to lack of older data.  
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well as by comparing differences in prices before and after the reform for drugs that always 
faced PI-competition with those for drugs that never faced PI-competition.  
In a difference-in-differences setting one or several parameters capture fixed differences among 
the drugs, while one or several other parameters capture changes over time that are common to 
all drugs. We included drug specific fixed effects, i , to control for fixed differences among 
individual drugs. For example, the fixed effects control for differences in severity of side effects 
and other aspects of the drugs themselves that might affect their price. The fixed effects also 
control for most of the variation in demand across observations, in fact for 87% of the variation 
in units sold. To control for changes over time that are common to all drugs we included a linear 
time-trend; a dummy variable taking the value one after the mandatory substitution reform; and 
dummy variables for calendar months.16 We also included variables to control for price changes 
as a result of being subject to competition from parallel imports; number of parallel trading firms 
importing the drug; number of months a drug had faced such competition; being subject to 
competition from therapeutic alternatives; number of therapeutic alternatives; and share of 
therapeutic alternatives facing generic competition. Then the main specifications are  
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The difference between specifications (1) and (2) is that Pifirmsit and Ref*Pifirmsit are not 
included in (2), to facilitate the use of an instrumental variable method. If these two variables 
                                                            
16 As discussed in the Appendix, similar results were obtained using year-month dummies to control for common  
price changes. Year-month dummies were not included in the main specifications, however, in order to use time-
variation in the instruments for identification.  
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were in the estimation, there would be too many endogenous variables to instrument. 
Specification (1) was estimated with fixed-effects OLS estimator, while specification (2) was 
estimated with fixed-effects OLS and a fixed-effects IV estimator, resulting in three estimations. 
To check the robustness of the results and to verify what the estimates describe, we also 
estimated many other specifications, described briefly in the Appendix and in footnotes where 
we also discuss their results. 
The parameters β1-β4 describe the effects of competition from parallel imports before the 
mandatory substitution reform and, together with β5-β7, the effects after the reform. β1 and β4 
describe the effect of facing PI-competition at all and how this effect changed over time. β2 
describes how the effect relates to the number of parallel trading firms importing the drug, and β3 
shows the effect of the number of months a drug had already faced competition from parallel 
imports.17 The identifying assumption for these parameters is that no other variables, except 
those included in the specification, caused price changes that are correlated with facing 
competition from parallel imports. Since therapeutic competition can have important effects on 
prices and might be correlated with PI-competition, we included Thcompit, Nthcompit and 
Thgencompit in the specifications as well.18,19 
The parameters β5-β7 for the interaction variables describe how the reform has influenced the 
price effect of competition from parallel imports. A requirement for these parameters to be 
correctly estimated is that no excluded variable influenced the price effect of facing PI-
competition differently before the reform relative to after the reform. This requirement is one 
important motive for including Mpiit and Ref*Mpiit in the specifications. There are several 
reasons why Mpiit - which is correlated with the reform - could influence prices.20 First, before 
the reform, the pharmaceutical committees recommended pharmacists dispense only parallel 
                                                            
17 Separate effects of Mpiit and Timepiit were identified by data on drugs changing from facing pi-competition to not  
facing it, or vice versa, at different times during the study period. For drugs that faced pi-competition none or all 
months of the study-period, Mpiit and Timepiit are perfectly correlated. 
18 The share of drugs facing therapeutic competition is statistically significantly higher among the drugs facing  
    competition from parallel imports than those not facing such competition at all, but the difference is small in size:  
    only 5 percentage points. 
19 Ellison et al. (1997), Brekke et al. (2009), and Lichtenberg and Philipson (2002) provide evidence on therapeutic  
competition.  
20 The mean of Mpiit is statistically significantly larger after the reform than before, and for drugs facing  
pi-competition this difference is large: 7.74 (std. err. 0.30).   
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imports that had a record of reliable supply (Persson, Anell and Persson, 2001). Second, the 
longer a parallel imported drug had been in the market, the more familiar consumers, physicians, 
and pharmacists would be with it, making it a stronger competitor for the locally-sourced drug.21 
Third, if a parallel import had been sold in Sweden for a long time, without any supply shortages, 
or even interruptions due to possible strategic response of manufacturers like supply rationing in 
the source countries, then the price approving authority might consider the parallel import a 
reliable alternative for the locally-sourced drug and therefore dare to be tougher in its decisions 
regarding approval of price increases for the locally-sourced drug. 
The identifying requirement for the parameters β5-β7 was also the main reason why we included 
Timepiit in the specifications, to capture changes over time in the effect of facing PI-competition 
not caused by the substitution reform but perhaps by changed consumer attitudes toward parallel 
imports.22 Lastly, interaction variables between the reform and controls for therapeutic 
competition were included since, as discussed before, there are reasons to expect that the effects 
of facing therapeutic competition were increased by the reform. 
An obvious problem is that entry decisions of parallel traders are determined by the prices of 
pharmaceuticals. In other words, the variables controlling for PI-competition might be 
endogenous, and hence the OLS estimator might be biased. This problem is reduced by inclusion 
of fixed effects, since parallel traders then must react to price changes within the study-period for 
the OLS estimator to be endogenous. Still, we cannot rule out the possibility of endogeneity, and 
therefore also conducted an instrumental variable estimation.23 
                                                            
21 Using data on on-patent prescription drugs sold in the county of Västerbotten, Sweden, during 2003-2006 (see  
Granlund and Rudholm (2008) for details of the dataset), we found that patients were statistically significantly 
less likely to oppose substitution by a parallel import the larger Mpiit was. Controlling for Mpiit, however, the 
patients became more likely to oppose substitution over time. Since Mpiit is correlated with sales volume of the 
parallel import, we estimated the fixed-effects IV specification including the market share of parallel imports, but 
got similar results regarding Mpiit, suggesting that this is not the explanation to its effect.  
22 Timepiit accounts for the differences in the time trend of drugs subject to pi-competition and drugs not subject to  
it. Before the reform, the time trend of drugs subject to pi-competition was different from that of drugs not subject 
to it. Even though the time trend differs between the two groups, the difference in time trend is stable over time, 
implying that the difference could be captured by Timepiit. 
23 The therapeutic competition variables might be endogenous to some degree as well, since high prices for a drug  
can make competing pharmaceutical firms more likely to invest in R&D for therapeutic alternatives. Moreover, 
firms could choose not to launch their products in Sweden if the prices of therapeutic alternatives in Sweden are 
low. The first source of endogeneity is likely to be small, since firms make their investment decision based on 
expectation of future prices around the world without having perfect foresight, and since the Swedish market, for  
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The five possible endogenous variables, Picompit, Mpiit, Ref*Picompit, Ref*Mpiit, and Timepiit, 
are all functions of Picomp and highly correlated; with correlations among the five ranging from 
0.54 to 0.91. To overcome the difficulties this creates for finding strong instruments, we 
employed a three-stage instrumental variable estimation. In the first stage, OLS estimation was 
employed to explain and predict Picomp, using the exogenous variables of specification (2), 
including fixed effects, and a set of instruments (explained below). Drugs with no variation in 
Picomp during the study period were not included in this regression since the instruments have 
no predictive power for Picomp for them, and since the inclusion of fixed effects means that 
there is no endogeneity problem for them either. Instead, true values were used as predictions for 
Picomp for these drugs. Then, the predictions for Picomp were used to create predictions for 
Mpiit, Timepiit, Ref*Picompit, and Ref*Mpiit.24 Lastly, the predictions for all five possible 
endogenous variables are used as instruments for their actual values in a 2SLS estimation, using 
the xtivreg2 command by Schaffer (2010).  
This method has two advantages over a standard two-stage IV-method where all endogenous 
variables are instrumented directly, using the same set of instruments. First, this method will 
predict similar drugs to face PI-competition both before and after the reform, which means that 
the estimated effect of the reform on PI-competition will not be affected by changes in the drugs 
facing PI-competition. Second, and more importantly, it yields robust estimates for the possible 
endogenous variables. When predicting all endogenous variables directly, the instrument sets 
were found to be weak for at least one of the possible endogenous variables, resulting in 
unreliable estimates which were not robust even to small changes in the instrument sets. 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
most drugs, constitutes a relatively small share of the entire market (Pharmaceutical consumption in Sweden 
constituted 0.7% of the total pharmaceutical consumption in the OECD in 2005, OECD, 2008). The second 
source of endogeneity is likely to be small as well since the prices of pharmaceuticals in Sweden are about the 
average of the large markets in the European Union (Lundkvist, 2002). 
24 The first stage regression also used only data from the period January 2001 through April 2004. Thus, only  
variations in Mpiit within this period could be predicted for each product. With fixed effects, subtracting a product 
specific constant from Mpiit did not affect the estimates for this variable. However, this prevented us from 
including Mpiit nonlinearly, e.g., Mpi2it . OLS results including Mpi2it were, however, very similar to those 
excluding it, suggesting that it is not important to include it. OLS estimation using dummy variables for each 
value of Mpiit also indicated that the effect of Mpiit was nearly linear up to values of 50 months, but no additional 
effect was found for even higher values. Only 1.5% of the observations in the dataset had values of Mpi exceeding 
50. These results are available from the authors upon request. 
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Several sets of instruments were tested, nearly all inspired by Ganslandt and Maskus (2004). We 
report the full results obtained when using the Euro/SEK exchange rate as instrument but also the 
key results obtained when using the logarithm of the number of months the product had been 
sold in Sweden (Lnlongit), as well as key results obtained when using both the exchange rate and 
Lnlongit as instruments. The Euro/SEK exchange rate is the instrument thought most likely to be 
exogenous, though Lnlongit should also be exogenous since we controlled for therapeutic 
competition. Other instrument sets tested include interaction between Euro/SEK and sales values 
in 1995 and transformations of Lnlong.25 
During the study period, important source countries such as Italy, Greece, and Spain switched to 
the Euro as currency or fixed their exchange rate towards the Euro. The Euro/SEK exchange rate 
therefore affected price differences between locally-sourced drugs in Sweden and the source 
countries, an important determinant for parallel traders’ entry decisions. Lnlongit could also be a 
good instrument since the probability that a drug is also sold in low price countries increased 
with the number of months it had been sold in Sweden, and since it might take a few months 
after it was first sold in both Sweden and a source country before parallel traders could establish 
relevant contacts and get the approval from the Medical Products Agency. We used the natural 
logarithm since the effect of the number of months on entry of parallel traders was thought likely 
to decrease. Also, an untransformed variable representing the number of months from first sale 
would be perfectly correlated with Timeit and therefore unusable as an instrument. 
 
Results 
The three main sets of full estimation results are presented in Table 3, while Table 4 presents the 
key results from regressions with other instruments. All reported coefficients and standard errors 
in the tables and elsewhere are the estimates multiplied by 100. In the Appendix we report the 
results of the robustness analyses, showing that the results are quite insensitive to changes in the 
specifications. 
                                                            
25 As mentioned above, Lnlongit is the natural logarithm of a variable truncated at 108.5 months due to lack of older  
data. Including a dummy variable for those with a value of 108.5 or higher did not contribute to explaining 
Picompit, however, so it was not included as an instrument.  
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Differentials are also presented at the bottom of the Table 3 and in Table 4 describing the 
average effect of the variables of main interest on prices. The differential dlnP/dPicomp was 
calculated using the estimates for the seven pi-variables as well as the average value of these 
variables when Picomp equals one. For the IV estimation (Table 3), the differential indicates that 
drugs facing PI-competition had 15% lower prices on average compared to what they would 
have had if they had never faced PI-competition.26 Similar results were obtained from 
estimations 4 and 5 (Table 4) and for other, not reported, IV estimations with different 
instruments. For the OLS estimations, the corresponding figures are less than 4%, indicating that 
endogeneity bias is considerable. 
Pifirms and Ref*Pifirms both had positive coefficients in estimation 1, possibly caused by 
endogeneity, but perhaps because manufacturing firms might have increased prices to extract as 
much as possible from price-insensitive loyal consumers if competition from parallel imports 
became too fierce.27 The coefficients for Mpi in all estimations indicate that the full effect of 
facing PI-competition was not felt immediately.28 Compared to the estimates from the OLS 
regression (estimation 2 in table 3), that for Mpi from the IV regression is lower (i.e., more 
negative), but that for Timepi is approximately as much higher. These differences might not be 
caused by endogeneity, but perhaps by correlation between these variables, as high as 0.8, which 
means that the differences between the coefficients are estimated imprecisely (Greene 2003: 
Chapter 4). However, the joint effect of these variables is not affected by this high correlation. 
The differential dlnP/d (Ref*Picomp) indicates that mandatory substitution had increased the 
effect of PI-competition, but by less than one percentage point. For the OLS regressions the 
result is driven by the effect of Ref*Picomp, but for the IV regression it is mainly explained by 
the negative estimate for Ref*Mpi. 
 
                                                            
26 Since the dependent variable is in logarithmic form, the exact change in price (in percent) should be calculated  
using the formula 100כ[exp(β)-1]. 
27 Frank and Salkever (1992) discuss the similar so called “generic paradox” that brand name producers might react  
to generic competition by increasing their prices. Frank and Salkever (1997) and Grabowski and Vernon (1992) 
provide evidence that brand-name prices increase after entry of generics.   
28 For observations with Picomp equal to one, the average values for Mpi and Ref*Mpi are 27.26 and 15.49,  
respectively. The Mpi-variables thus account for more than 75% of the estimates for dlnP/dPicomp in all three 
estimations. 
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Table 3. Estimation results, multiplied by 100
 
  (1) OLS  (2) OLS (3) IV
Picompit  0.041  0.323** ‐11.076***  (0.187)  (0.150) (1.595)
Pifirmsit 0.197***   (0.072) 
Mpiit  ‐0.145***  ‐0.135*** ‐0.444***  (0.011)  (0.011) (0.054)
Timepiit  0.002  ‐0.004 0.360***  (0.012)  (0.011) (0.059)
Ref*Picompit  ‐1.247***  ‐1.043*** ‐0.028  (0.314)  (0.252) (0.410)
Ref*Pifirmsit 0.051 
 (0.082) 
Ref*Mpiit 0.013**  0.010 ‐0.027**
 (0.005)  (0.006) (0.011)
Thcompit ‐0.395  ‐0.404 ‐0. 316
 (0.340)  (0.340) (0.343)
Nthcompit 0.121**  0.126** 0.106**
 (0.050)  (0.050) (0.051)
Thgencompit  ‐3.142***  ‐3.167*** ‐3.012***
 (0.360)  (0.360) (0.365)
Ref*Thcompit  ‐0.826***  ‐0.819*** ‐0.726***  (0.209)  (0.207) (0.210)
Ref*Nthcompit  ‐0.185***  ‐0.185*** ‐0.189***
 (0.027)  (0.027) (0.027)
Ref*Thgencompit ‐0.521***  ‐0.542*** ‐0.649***
 (0.162)  (0.161) (0.164)
Reft 1.146***  1.147*** 1.155***
 (0.158)  (0.158) (0.160)
Timet ‐0.037***  ‐0.037*** ‐0.038***
 (0.005)  (0.005) (0.005)
d lnP/d Picomp ‐3.776***  ‐3.848*** ‐16.066***
 (0.221)  (0.213) (1.765)
d lnP/d (Ref*Picomp) ‐0.733***  ‐0.735*** ‐0.867***
 (0.182)  (0.185) (0.207)
d lnP/d Thcomp ‐1.494***  ‐1.490*** ‐1.413***
 (0.357)  (0.357) (0.361)
d lnP/d (Ref*Thcomp) ‐1.659***  ‐1.659*** ‐1.606***
 (0.154)  (0.153) (0.155)
Sample size 102,187  102,187 102,187
Log likelihood 148,563.8  148,558.8 147,868.2
Notes: The asterisks ***, ** and * denote that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels. Standard errors that are robust against heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation are shown in parentheses. 
For the IV-specifications, F value for significance of the instrument (the Euro/SEK exchange rate) in the first stage 
regression was 17.70. The differentials were evaluated at the mean of each variable when the relevant explanatory 
variable, i.e., Picomp, Ref*Picomp, Thcomp, or Ref*Thcomp, took the value one. Estimation results for calendar 
months are suppressed to save space, but are available from the author upon request. 
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Table 4. Estimation results from IV regressions with instruments Lnlong, and both 
EURO/SEK and Lnlong, multiplied by 100
   (4) IV   (5) IV
d lnP/d Picomp  ‐18.720***  ‐17.461***
  (1.984)  (1.871)
d lnP/d (Ref*Picomp)  ‐0.855***  ‐0.861*** 
  (0.209)  (0.208)
Sample size  102,187  102,187
Log likelihood  147,567.9  147,728.2
Notes: For estimation 4, the F value for significance of the instrument (Lnlong) in the first stage regression was 
108.32. For estimation 5, the F value for significance of the instruments (the Euro/SEK exchange rate and Lnlong) in 
the first stage regression was 65.26. See also notes to Table 3. 
 
The estimates for the therapeutic competition variables, Thcomp, Nthcomp, and Thgencomp, 
indicate that, before the reform, the effect of facing such competition was small if the therapeutic 
alternatives did not face generic competition, but the effect increased substantially if they gained 
generic competition. The reform increased the importance of whether therapeutic competitors 
face generic competition, reflecting that the reform led to lower generic prices and lower prices 
of brand-name drugs facing generic competition. The reform also substantially increased the 
effect of Thcomp, probably because the Pharmaceutical Benefits Agency (LFN), unlike its 
predecessor prior to the reform, had a clear instruction to consider marginal benefits and costs of 
a drug before deciding whether or not to approve its suggested price and list it for 
reimbursement. The average effect of facing therapeutic competition during the study-period was 
a price reduction of 1.5% and the reform increased the effect of therapeutic competition by 1.6 
percentage points. This means that the reform more than tripled this effect from 0.7% to 2.3%. 
Our results on therapeutic competition are consistent with Brekke et al. (2009) and Ellison et al. 
(1997) showing that drugs with the same active ingredient - generics in their case - are closer 
substitutes than drugs with different active ingredients but similar therapeutic effects. 
Lastly, the estimates for Timet show that the prices of drugs not facing PI-competition fell over 
time. The estimates for Reft indicate that the prices of drugs not subject to pi- or therapeutic 
competition were positively associated with the reform, but this coefficient might capture 
something besides causal effects of the reform. 
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Conclusions  
We analyzed the effects of competition from parallel imports on prices of all locally-sourced on-
patent prescription drugs sold in Sweden during January 2001-April 2004 and whether 2002 
mandatory substitution reform affected this competition.  
Using an instrumental variable method, we found that drugs facing competition from parallel 
imports had 15-17% lower prices on average compared to what they would have had if they had 
never faced such competition. The corresponding estimate from OLS regressions was only 4%. 
The results are of similar magnitude to those of Ganslandt and Maskus (2004) despite that we 
controlled for therapeutic competition and indirect generic competition, covered all the on-patent 
prescription drugs, and analyzed a different period. Thus, our results confirm their conclusion 
that parallel imports substantially reduce prices of locally-sourced drugs.  
The large difference between the IV and the OLS results indicates that it is important to account 
for endogeneity caused by simultaneous determination of prices and entry decisions of parallel 
traders. The OLS result describes the association between prices and competition from parallel 
imports which was affected both by high prices encouraging entry of parallel traders, causing 
more positive (or less negative) association, and by the causal effect of competition from parallel 
imports itself. Therefore, OLS result gives only a lower bound on the absolute causal effect of 
competition from parallel imports.  
The mandatory substitution reform increased the effect of competition from parallel imports, but 
by less than one percentage point in absolute value. Thus, the effect of competition from parallel 
imports was large also when substitution was not mandatory. One reason could be that many 
pharmacies already before the mandatory substitution reform dispensed parallel imports to 
consumers whose physicians had not specified either a locally-sourced or parallel imported 
package. The full effect of parallel imports was not realized immediately, but rather the prices of 
locally-sourced drugs fell continuously as they faced competition from parallel imports. The IV-
results indicate that the reform has increased the intensity of competition from parallel imports 
mainly by strengthening this gradual effect. 
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Our empirical strategy made it possible to analyse the full effect of competition from parallel 
imports over time. The same strategy could be used to analyze the full effect of generic 
competition, which is a subject for future research.  
Our analysis has implications for the effect of mandatory substitution reform on therapeutic 
competition as well. The prices of drugs facing such competition were 1.5% less on average than 
they would have been otherwise. The reform increased the effect of therapeutic competition by 
1.6%. The results also show that the effect of therapeutic competition depended on whether the 
therapeutic competitors were subject to generic competition. Facing therapeutic competition led 
to a substantial fall in prices if the therapeutic competitors themselves were subject to generic 
competition. The reform increased the effect of generic competition and thus this effect as well. 
Lichtenberg and Philipson (1997) showed that between-patent competition (therapeutic 
competition), most of which occurs while a drug is under patent, costs the patent holder at least 
as much as within-patent competition (generic competition), which cannot occur until a drug is 
off-patent. The results of this paper are in line with theirs by showing that patent holders are 
significantly hurt by competition, both from parallel imports and therapeutic alternatives, and 
also by showing that these forms of competition, particularly therapeutic competition, was 
strengthened by the reform. This evidence points at the debate on potential drawback of parallel 
trade and substitution policies, that is, they might cause patent holders to lose profits and hence 
to invest less in innovation. 
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Appendix: Robustness analysis of key results 
We conducted OLS regressions including Mpi2 and Ref*Mpi2 as well as specifications including 
40 year-month dummies instead of 11 month dummies (Month), the time trend (Time) and the 
dummy for the reform (Ref). Including Mpi2 and Ref*Mpi2 reduced dlnP/dPicomp by a half 
percentage point and dlnP/d (Ref*Picomp) by about 0.1 percentage point in absolute terms. 
Including year-month dummies reduced the average estimated effect of PI-competition by about 
0.6 percentage point, but changed the estimate for dlnP/d(Ref*Picomp) by less than 0.1 
percentage point. Thus, Time and Ref seem to have captured changes over time common to all 
drugs sufficiently well that such changes had little effect on the key results. 
We also estimated specifications 1 and 2 separately for drugs that never, or always, faced PI-
competition. The estimates for dlnP/d (Ref*Picomp) for this restricted sample was -0.432 (0.257) 
and -0.430 (0.250) for specifications 1 and 2, that is, slightly smaller compared to the estimates 
for the whole sample: -0.773 (0.182) and -0.735 (0.185), respectively. 
As argued in the section on econometric analysis, including Mpi and Timepi might be important 
for estimating the effect of the mandatory substitution reform correctly. To test this, we ran 
regression 3 excluding Mpi and Ref*Mpi; excluding Timepi; and excluding all three 
simultaneously. Excluding only Mpi and Ref*Mpi, or only Timepi, had very little impact on the 
estimates for dlnP/d(Ref*Picomp), but excluding all three simultaneously led to an estimate of 
-3.061 (0. 202) , compared to the estimate from regression 3 (-0.867 (0.207)). 
As noted earlier, the identifying assumption for the effect of the mandatory substitution reform 
on the price-effect of PI-competition (dlnP/d(Ref*Picomp)) was that no excluded variable 
influence the price-effect of facing PI-competition differently before and after the reform. By 
including the interaction variable between time trend and dummy for facing PI-competition 
(Timepiit), we allowed drugs facing such competition to have a different time trend relative to 
those not facing it, without this biasing the estimator of the effect of the reform on PI-
competition. Still, this estimator might be biased if factors not accounted for in the regressions 
affected the two groups differently, and if these factors increased or decreased over time in an 
unstable manner so that their effects could not be captured by Timepi, for example, if something 
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affecting the two groups differently occurred only during a certain part of the study-period. To 
test the importance of this problem we ran regression 3 for different periods: January 2000-April 
2004, January 2002-April 2004, and January 2001-June 2003. We also ran regression 3 using the 
normal study period but excluding observations from April 2002, when the law regarding 
mandatory substitution was passed by parliament, through October 2002; and excluding 
observations from January 2002, when the bill was presented to parliament, through October 
2002. Besides functioning as sensitivity analyses, these latter two regressions were designed to 
give an idea whether firms started to adjust their prices even before the reform came into effect. 
We also ran regression 3 excluding the first 3, 6, or 9 months after the reform. 
For these regressions, the estimated average reform-effect on PI-competition was in the range 
-1.279 to -0.830 and different from zero at the 5%-level of statistical significance. These results 
indicate that the estimates for dlnP/d(Ref*Picomp) are stable to changes in the study-period. No 
evidence was found of firms adjusting prices before the reform came into effect. 
Would variation in Mpi in the distant past matter less than in the recent past? To examine this, 
we ran regression 2 including the following variables Mpid01it, Mpid13it, Mpid36it, Mpid612it, 
Mpid1224it, Mpid2436it - where Mpid01it=Mpiit-Mpii,t-1, Mpid13it=Mpii,t-1-Mpii,t-3, and so on - as 
well as interaction variables between the reform and each of these variables. We found no 
evidence that variation in Mpi in the distant past mattered less than more recent variation, since 
the differential with respect to Mpid01it was of similar magnitude to that with respect to 
Mpid2436it. 
We also investigated whether the relationship between Mpi and pharmaceutical prices might be 
explained by that drugs facing PI-competition were less able to adjust their prices to keep up 
with inflation. Since the Pharmaceutical Benefits Agency approves nominal prices, not real 
prices, this could be the case if the agency were less willing to allow price increases for drugs 
with PI-competition. To investigate this we ran a regression with the Mpi variables replaced by a 
variable describing the consumer price index (CPI) and variables describing changes in it that 
occurred during months when a drug faced PI-competition; as well as regressions including both 
the Mpi and the CPI variables. The likelihood values were lower when CPI variables were 
included instead of the Mpi variables, suggesting that the Mpi variables better explain the 
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variations in prices. Also, the estimates for the Mpi variables were relatively robust against 
inclusion of the CPI variables as well, while the estimates for several of the CPI variables 
became statistically non-significant when the Mpi variables were included. Therefore, we 
conclude that the relationship between Mpi and pharmaceutical prices is not explained by the 
Pharmaceutical Benefits Agency being less willing to approve price increases for drugs facing 
PI-competition. Instead, the relationship is likely explained by consumers and pharmacists 
becoming less reluctant to use parallel imports the longer they have been in the market, as 
discussed earlier. 
Finally, we ran several regressions including Pifirms2 (squared) or using dummy variables to 
account for the number of parallel traders. However, unlike Ganslandt and Maskus (2004), we 
found no evidence of prices being reduced more when additional parallel traders entered the 
market after the first, unless we simultaneously excluded the Mpi variables and Timepi. Since 
specifications including the number of parallel traders only could be estimated with OLS, we 
cannot interpret this as showing that there is no additional price reducing effect. But our results 
suggest that any additional effect might be exaggerated if one has not accounted for the lagged 
effect of entry of parallel traders. The correlations between Pifirms and Mpi and Timepi, 
respectively, is 0.67 and 0.80, so it is not surprising that controlling for Mpi and Timepi affects 
the estimates for Pifirms. Full results from all estimations mentioned here are available from the 
authors upon request. 
 
